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Abstract: 
In this paper, I aim to explain and evaluate idealization and de-idealization as an epistemic strategy in 
the context of a more general issue, namely, how scientists produce knowledge that is manageable 
and adequate for scientific modeling of concrete target systems such as the properties or the 
dynamical behavior of technological devices. The epistemic purpose of these scientific models is to 
enable relevant and reliable reasoning about them (e.g., towards creating a desired property, or 
designing, improving, optimizing or controlling a process). 
Nancy Cartwright has been enormously influential in making philosophers aware of the limitations of 
scientific knowledge, especially when it comes to applying it to real systems. In laboratories, we 
develop reproducibly functioning experimental set-ups in such a way that stable, repeatable patterns 
of data are produced, from which we infer to laws of nature. Cartwright (1983, 1999) calls these law-
producing experimental set-ups nomological machines. She rightly argues that laws of nature, and 
scientific models derived from them, are only true at those idealized conditions and usually do not 
present us with true descriptions of real systems. 
Nevertheless, (de-)idealization is an important epistemic strategy in the production of scientific 
knowledge about concrete target systems. De-idealization is closely related to some other epistemic 
strategies such as: conceptualization (which is the strategy to introduce conceptions of phenomena, 
for instance, specific physical properties, by means of operational definitions in terms of 
paradigmatic experimental set-ups; see Feest 2010, Boon 2012); abstraction (which is the strategy to 
produce representations that abstract from some of the concrete content); mathematization (which 
is the strategy to subsume measured data-sets under mathematical formula); and simplification 
(which is the strategy of neglecting in our description aspects that supposedly have a negligible 
contribution).  
In order to explain and evaluate (de-)idealization, I will address the following questions: (I) What is 
idealization and how does it work in the production of scientific knowledge? (II) How does 
application of ‘idealized knowledge’ in the modeling of concrete target systems go about? (III) Why is 
idealization productive as an epistemic strategy? 
(ad. I) I will propose that (de-)idealization concerns the way in which scientific practices develop 
experimental set-ups for ‘discovering’ natural regularities. This strategy involves technologically 
isolating a part of the world such that it exhibits reproducible behavior (i.e., phenomena) that can be 
studied at varying but controlled and measurable conditions.  
(ad. II) Subsequently, conceptual and mathematical descriptions of ‘isolated’ phenomena, in concord 
with knowledge of the paradigmatic experimental set-ups at which they have been produced, enable 
us to identify the occurrence of such phenomena in a concrete target systems under study, and build 
our knowledge of this phenomenon in the model of the target system. Furthermore, the 
paradigmatic experimental set-up plays a key-role in investigating the phenomenon at ‘non-ideal’, 
‘non-isolated’ conditions of the target system. 
(ad. III) Examples from chemical engineering, biotechnology and material sciences will be presented 
such to illustrate this view. 
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